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Dossier. Les droites latino-américaines pendant la guerre froide (1959-1990)

The Hispanic Community of Nations: the Spanish-Argentine nexus and the imagining of a Hispanic Cold War bloc

Daniel Gunnar Kressel
p. 115-133

Résumés

La Communauté hispanique des nations : connexion hispano-argentine et volonté de création d’un bloc hispanique dans le contexte de la guerre froide

Cet article retrace l’histoire d’un réseau espagnol et argentin d’intellectuels fascistes pendant la guerre froide. Il décrit la façon dont ils développèrent l’idée d’une citoyenneté supranationale latino-américaine, dans l’espoir d’unifier le monde hispanophone en un seul et même « bloc hispanique ». L’article explore ce projet transatlantique depuis son enthousiaste inauguration en 1954, jusqu’à son déclin vers la fin des années 1960. Ce rêve néo-impérial d’une unification spirituelle rencontra de multiples obstacles, obligeant ses partisans à changer plusieurs fois de stratégie. À la suite de la révolution cubaine de 1959, le régime de Francisco Franco opta pour une politique de traités de « double-citoyenneté » avec les dictatures des Andes, des Caraïbes et d’Amérique centrale, dans l’espoir de mettre un frein à tout futur mouvement révolutionnaire dans le continent. Cependant, l’article montre qu’après la montée au pouvoir en Espagne d’une élite technocratique associée à l’Opus Dei, les nationalistes argentins, et en particulier la « Révolution argentine » de Juan Carlos Onganía, se mirent en tête de perpétuer le mouvement hispaniste d’unification vers la fin des années 1960.

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  • 1 Alberto Martín Artajo, one of the more reactionary figures in Franco’s regime said these words whil (...)

1On October 18th 1948, in a speech in Argentina, Spain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Alberto Martín Artajo declared that “the spiritual unity between our peoples manifests itself in mutual style—a similar way of being”, and elaborated that in a “world of crisis” there is no place for ideological alliances but “solely familiar and religious ones”.1 In the following two decades a network of Spanish and Argentine intellectuals would give concrete meaning to these statements. By the mid-1950’s they formally proposed to establish a “Hispanic Community of Nations”, as a supranational political constellation and a “bloc” within the Cold War system. The present study brings to the fore an analysis of this transatlantic neo-fascist fantasy, from its ceremonial initiation in Nationalist Spain to its Argentine vicissitudes during the 1960’s. By so doing, my account gives insight into the imaginaire of these right-wing ideologues.

2In the decades following the Second World War, international fascism, as an anti-enlightenment revolutionary movement of the right, ostensibly reached a political dead end. As a profound belief system, however, fascism did not disappear altogether. Nationalist Spain (1936-1975), in particular, had a distinctive role in the perpetuation of right-wing ideologies in this period. Under the auspice of General Francisco Franco, and within a new context of the Cold War, this regime promptly linked with its ideological counterparts in the Latin American right, which by then, too, had been learning from the “errors” of fascism. As we shall see in what follows, the most important lesson was the need for national movements to unify under larger “cultural umbrellas” in order to preserve their unique spiritual essence.

  • 2 Or as Federico Finchelstein points out, this case goes to show that paradoxically fascism thrives m (...)

3Occupying many of the following pages are two idiosyncratic fascist milieus that, under the pressure of the changing world around them, formed a somewhat unlikely bond: the Spanish Falange (FET) and the Argentine Nacionalistas. Whereas the former faced the rise of powerful Catholic-technocratic elites within Franco’s regime, the latter fell into disarray due to the fall of the Axis Powers and the rise of Juan Perón’s authoritarian populism.2 Thus, I raise the possibility that a unity of fate, perhaps more than proximity of faith, led these two intellectual groups to join forces and design a global Hispanic unification. Their joint proposition was quite unusual: hispanidad (Spanishness or “hispanism”)—as a spiritual condition and tangible cultural reality—should unite whoever believes himself to be within its realms into a new political and economic sphere that would defy the Cold War “materialist” enemies.

4Thus, I hope to provide further insights on what Historian Tanya Harmer has labeled “the inter-American Cold War” [Harmer, 2011]. I use a variety of representations to suggest that the Hispanic neo-imperial campaign developed in tandem with local political circumstances rather than in correlation with the advent of Cold War strains. Broadly speaking, I suggest that the demand for spiritual and political integration was a ubiquitous component of the Latin American right-wing discourse, thus far overlooked by historians of the Cold War. Despite ultimately being a failed project, I show that propagating a Hispanic community provided regimes with a sense of ideological cohesion and duty, and should therefore be considered a distinctive pattern within the genealogy of Latin America’s right-wing authoritarian thought.

Envisioning the Hispanic bloc: Franco’s Falange and the birth of cultura hispánica

  • 3 The strategic pact with the United States in 1949, and acceptance to the UN in 1955 meant that Fran (...)

5The late 1940’s saw Spain gradually recuperating from a state of international isolation, imposed by the Allies after May 1945.3 There are those who argue that during these years “the doctrine of hispanidad reached rock-bottom” [Pollack, 1987, p.  13]. That, I argue, is a hyperbole. True enough, after 1945, and even before, with the sacking of the pro-Nazi strongman Ramón Serrano Súñer, the Francoist regime purified itself from many of its previous “fascist” characteristics such as the fascist salute [Tusell, 2007, p.  58-64]. This notwithstanding, hispanidad remained Francoism’s one conspicuous discursive ground. And the promotion of the Hispanic message to Latin America would become, in fact, the one mission that united the different ideologies that are nowadays regarded as the “families” of Francoism.

  • 4 According to Javier Tusell from its very beginning: “Franco’s dictatorship can much better be descr (...)
  • 5 A member of José Antonio Primo de Rivera’s original inner circle, Laín Entralgo aligns with Américo (...)
  • 6 For instance, Ernesto Giménez Caballero’s canonical El genio de España is completely absent of this (...)

6Historians of the Spanish dictatorship typically discuss Francoism as a nationalist-Catholic state ideology that, at certain points in time, acquired fascist traits [Tusell, 1989; Saz Campos, 2004]. The conventional wisdom is that Franco’s regime exploited the Falange’s symbols and that the latter ultimately repelled the reactionary dictator by provoking a “liberal resistance” [Gracia García, 2004, p. 21]. I offer a corrective to this last argument by suggesting that the Falange not only served Francoism willingly, more often than not, but was also the key actor in Spain’s connection with Latin America. If anything, the emerging quarrel between the Falange and groups, such as the Catholic society Opus Dei, made this vocation even more important.4 Here, I am referring to the 1949 intellectual polemic over Spain’s ontological essence (el Ser de España). Falange intellectual Pedro Laín Entralgo then daringly argued that hispanidad is merely a contingent cultural singularity—a “style of living” that assumes free will.5 Opus Dei intellectual Rafael Calvo Serer retaliated by addressing hispanidad as a fixed ontology and adducing Ramiro de Maeztu’s Defensa de la hispanidad—a canonic text of yearning for a pre-modern Iberian utopia. More important, by stressing that Spain must “liberate itself from the modern, from revolution” he antagonized the Falange’s revolutionary ethos, which endeavored a reconfiguration rather than elimination the modern [Calvo Serer, 1949, p.  21]. As inconsequential as these debates might seem to us now, they are crucial for understanding of the Falangist’s incentive to be propagators of hispanidad—a term that had never been, in truth, a notable component in their founding fathers’ legacy.6

  • 7 Instituto de Cultura Hispánica, Servicios de Información Cultural, Madrid, March 15th, 1962, p.  1.
  • 8 Sanchez Bella expressed his pride over the quantity of the ICH conventions, held in Bogotá, Quito, (...)

7A new agency by the name of Instituto de Cultura Hispánica (ICH) eventually would become the stage where the Falange would reclaim its ideological authority. Established in Madrid in 1946, this was the new indisputable home for the world’s most notorious fascists. It was here that Carl Schmitt could be found giving lectures on “the world order after WWII”.7 ICH’s lavish international “cultural journals”—Cuadernos hispanoamericanos and the color-printed Mundo hispánico—regularly hosted intellectuals such Mexican philosopher José Vasconcelos, Chilean priest Osvaldo Lira and Romanian writer Vintilă Horia, making ICH the home of Latin America’s hispanistas. On an organizational level, ICH operated is a typical Francoist divide-and-rule manner: Laín Entralgo and Falange poet Luis Rosales edited Cuadernos hispanoamericanos, while Franco’s die-hard Alfredo Sánchez Bella and the notorious neo-fascist Blas Piñar, directed the institution as a whole, under the command of the Catholic-reactionary Alberto Martín Artajo. Even so, ICH became the paramount apparatus behind the emerging Hispanic movement. From its web of affiliated Latin American offices, to its biannual conferences, it even physically unified the right-wing intellectual world in one place.8

  • 9 Terms taken from his notorious speech at the Día de la Hispanidad in Zaragoza (1954) and Barcelona (...)
  • 10 More on the “prerogatives of the mother”; see for instance “Una familia de pueblos”, Mundo hispánic (...)
  • 11 In this case, in Franco’s own speeches, see for instance “Discurso de Jefe del Estado en el Consejo (...)

8And it was precisely upon this platform that Martín Artajo first promulgated the Hispanic Community of Nations, presented from the start as a supranational citizenship. In his own words: “We will be Spanish and Hispanics, Argentine and Hispanics, Mexican and Hispanics […]. All of us must possess, apart from our own citizenship, a mutual Hispanic citizenship, that the jurist would have to regulate and the statesmen—incorporate into their norms of government.”9 Spain, needless to say, would not merely join this union; a benevolent mother nation, its new role would be to pacify its progenies and guide them back to their universal civilizing mission.10 Last, in the spirit of the times, the Hispanic emancipation was proposed in terms of “decolonization” and even “international law”.11

  • 12 What historian of fascism Robert Paxton refers to as “a sense of overwhelming crisis beyond the rea (...)
  • 13 Raimundo Fernández Cuesta, “Una política de autenticidad”, Mundo hispánico, n° 73, 1954, p.  9.
  • 14 As the ICH’s 1958 Bogotá Declaration puts it. See Itinerarios de cultura hispánica: memoria del Seg (...)
  • 15 Blanca de los Ríos, “Hispanidad”, ABC Sevilla, October 23rd, 1953.

9What the ICH’s representations did best at this period, however, was reintroducing the all-familiar 1930’s fascist discourse of crisis into the Cold War debate.12 That is to say, over the course of the 1950’s the ICH afforded much effort to defining the “materialist” foes from the hands of which the Hispanic spirit is infinitely victimized. In Raimundo Fernández Cuesta’s labels, the “spiritual bloc” is an act of self-defense against the “satanic” communistic plot and the western “atomizing liberalism”—with its “fictitious inorganic universal suffrage”.13 The ICH thus promoted clear moral absolutes; whereas Nazism was scorned as “totalitarian”, the “Hispanic consciousness” represented an ethically superior form of existence.14 And Spain’s Civil War—along with the “only oasis of peace in the world” it had established15—was indeed presented as the exemplary roadmap for reaching this destination.

  • 16 Carlos Lacalle, “Diez años en la política de la hispanidad”, Mundo hispánico, n° 103, 1956, p.  3.
  • 17 His insinuation was that this state of affairs was due to Spain’s loss of empire (see Pedro Laín En (...)

10Interestingly, and despite often addressing the Hispanic “transcendental” mission, the discourse of hispanidad did not necessarily advocate a Catholic sacred. In fact, to borrow Ernesto Laclau’s vocabulary, by the mid-1950’s ICH had transformed hispanidad into somewhat of an “empty signifier” [Laclau, 1996, p.  36-46], as its spokespersons advised forsaking the question of its very denotation. Or in the words of Uruguayan poet Carlos Lacalle, “one lives hispanidad not thinks it.”16 In 1955, Laín Entralgo made one last attempt to define the Hispanic essence. Apart from the Spanish language, a mentality of “radical melancholy” was the element uniting the Hispanic subjects—this is about all the Falange’s key theorist could say.17

  • 18 “Doble nacionalidad”, ABC Sevilla, September 24th, 1954. The speech had been referred to also in “L (...)
  • 19 For several examples, see Jesús Prados Arrete, “Proyecto de una unión iberoamericana de pagos”, Cua (...)

11That is not to say that the Spaniards did not propagate concrete political action. Hampering any Latin American democratization by endorsing figures such as Rafael Trujillo were ICH’s avowed objectives. Tellingly, the Francoists broadcasted the words of the Dominican Generalísimo on national radio, in which he proposed an “invulnerable bloc against all foreign infiltration”.18 On a declarative level, ICH also attempted to challenge Pan-Americanism and its Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, by calling for an autonomous “Iberoamerican economic community” and a harmonious hemisphere of Pax hispanica.19 In short, Nationalist Spain proposed itself to Latin America as a holistic model for an Anti-Enlightenment resistance. The pages that follow present how the Argentine fascists radicalized this narrative.

Mario Amadeo and the renewal of the Argentine-Spanish Hispanic project

  • 20 To be sure, the friendship between Franco and Perón, which dated back to the 1946 Perón-Franco trea (...)

12The collaboration between the Nacionalistas and Franco’s regime has its own intricate history. In fact, Argentina’s right-wing ideologues collaborated with nationalist Spain on the conceptualization of hispanidad already in the 1940’s [González de Oleaga, 2001]. In the 1950’s, the Nacionalistas faced different political circumstances, however. Argentina’s mid-1940’s democratic restoration and the emergence of Peronism undermined the Nacionalista prestige. Subsequently, summoned by the Falange, a branch within the Nacionalista milieu keenly joined the deliberation on the future Hispanic bloc. Henceforth, the relationship between Franco’s intellectuals and Perón’s zealous opposition bloomed.20

  • 21 In fact, in the first edition of Cuadernos hispanoamericanos the Spanish were keen to voice the ide (...)
  • 22 Mario Amadeo, “Perspectivas de la conferencia de Bogotá”, Cuadernos hispanoamericanos, n° 2, 1948, (...)

13Mario Amadeo was, by this time, a renowned pro-Nazi intellectual, as well as a disciple of Maeztu’s philosophy of hispanidad. Following the downfall of the Axis he now rediscovered his Spanish intellectual roots, for instance in the writings of José Antonio Primo de Rivera and José Ortega y Gasset [Rock, 1993, p.  154]. In the early 1950’s, it was he who directed the Buenos Aires ICH branch. Being the editor of some of the more noticeable Nacionalista publications such as Sol y Luna, the ICH bade him to coedit Cuadernos hispanoamericanos together with Laín Entralgo.21 Here, Amadeo was free to unleash his extreme brand of anti-liberalism. If in 1948 he maintained, cautiously perhaps, that Latin Americans “are still far from having lost their independence,”22 then in the early 1950’s his editorials expressed a recovered fascist tone and a more explicit Hispanic mythology:

  • 23 Mario Amadeo, “Hispanoamerica 1950”, appendix: “¿Adónde va Hispanoamérica?”, Cuadernos hispanoameri (...)

We the Hispano-Americans are in a dilemma. We must choose between the fidelity to our inner selves, that which is the path for greatness, or a resigned claudication […]. Either we let the modern world drag us down in its fall, or we form, thanks to a lucid and dynamic fidelity, a vanguard of a new world in which man does not reach the abomination of his own existence.23

  • 24 Mario Amadeo, “Bases para una politica Hispanoamericana”, appendix: “¿Adónde va Hispanoamérica?”, C (...)

14From this point on, it was Amadeo, rather than Laín Entralgo, who was the main advocate of the Hispanic Community of Nations, attacking the false “East-West dilemma” and stressing that from a spiritual perspective these blocs are identical. And as if there was any doubt, he also exclaimed that “a Hispanoamerica loyal to its own essence could never reach a profound intimacy with the USA.” On top of this, his texts bluntly dismiss any principal of “individual rights,” branding them as yet another form of “interventionism.” This last point is crucial: according to Amadeo’s ethical order, the right of collectives to follow their “spiritual hierarchy” holds a supreme position vis-à-vis the emerging discourse of human rights.24

15In a parallel vein, Amadeo also produced his own peculiar theory of “regio-nalism.” In his book Por una convivencia internacional: bases para una Comunidad Hispánica de Naciones, published by the ICH in 1956, he proposes this category as the key weapon to defy the emerging Cold War order. Nations can only sustain their independence through a wide regional cultural constellation, is the gist of his argument. Put slightly differently, Amadeo contends that national particula-risms necessitate a partially bonding universal affiliation in order not to succumb to a complete “materialist” universality and in order to achieve their full spiritual potential. It is therefore that Spain, being the origin of the Hispanic essence, is vital for this union. In Amadeo’s words: “The community we want cannot be conceived without the presences of Spain” [Amadeo, 1956 (a), p.  90].

  • 25 Juan Carlos Goyeneche, “Hispanoamerica y la unidad de cultura”, appendix: “¿Adónde va Hispanoaméric (...)

16Amadeo’s colleges from Sol y Luna soon joined him in deciphering the mysteries of hispanidad. Significantly, by the mid-1950’s the ICH published the works of several of Argentina’s notorious “doctrinal nationalists,” many of which cooperated with Franco during the early 1940’s [Zuleta Álvarez, 1975]. One of them was Juan Carlos Goyeneche. In 1951, he published a text that reiterates the hispanidad’s civilizing mission and its profound contradiction with European enlightenment, being driven by “the dream of the world’s metaphysical unity.” Consequently, he opines that there is no point in seeking development and economic growth, for this “civilization of abundance and metaphysical misery” would not resolve “spiritual anxiety.” Instead, he argues, Latin America requires “juridical, economic, political and spiritual unity”—a defensive formula against “the solutions of the masses, and the vanity of the ego.”25

  • 26 Estrada even assesses that it is the time for America to set an example for Europe, with a “style m (...)

17José María de Estrada is another telling case. At the heart of this ideologue’s analysis is the historicist notion that Latin America, following its independence from Spain, developed “tenuous nationalities.” Worse yet, is also became a hostage of “rationalism and organizing matters through reason.” Therefore, Estrada suggests understanding “hispanism” as the vocation to create a hybrid that is simultaneously “original and autochthonic in its human elements” and, more important, “Christian as Europe was in its best times.” Obviously, unlike his Falangist interlocutors, Estrada highlights here a nostalgic Catholic idealism at the heart of hispanidad. But then again, the essence that should bind the American nationalities into one spiritual confederation is not religiosity per se but rather the mission of disseminating the “universal catholic culture.” On the other hand, nationalism, Estrada explains, should be treated with caution as it results in “over defensive” myopia. Alluding to Nazism, he further exclaims that what might be grasped as “a salvation at start” ultimately propels a “sin of excess” and “fatal hate towards Reason.” In sum, unlike Goyeneche, Estrada ultimately preaches a rather assuaged proto-fascism, one that rejects any “collectivization and subjugation of man.”26

  • 27 According to Amadeo’s own account, the publication of his Zaragoza speech was prohibited in Argenti (...)

18In 1954, Amadeo eventually traveled to Spain in what would become a pivotal moment in the history of the Hispanic Community of Nations plan. Invited by Sánches Bella and Laín Entralgo his visit developed into a three-month lecture tour in Spain. His speech at the Fiesta de la Hispanidad in Zaragoza signaled Franco’s full alignment with the anti-Perón movement.27 Amadeo’s narrative opens in a belligerent tone, as he identifies the enemies, once more, as communism and the “anachronistic” liberal nationalism. “We want to speak our own language, which is neither the one of ‘the declarations of rights’ nor the dialectics of the rational liberalism” he continues, implying that the Hispanic bloc provide an alternative to the Modern [Amadeo, 1956 (a), p.  217]. “We need to decide whether we will unite under the name of ‘Hispanic Community of Nations’ or under the banner of ‘The Soviet Republics of Indo-America’”, Amadeo then pleads melodramatically, not before complimenting his host by proposing “a spirit of a crusade, such as the one the Spaniards had on that unforgettable morning of July the 18th” [Amadeo, 1956 (a), p.  216]. In short, Amadeo’s speech leaves no doubt that, in his view, any harmonization of the Americas will begin with a purifying civil war.

19Loyal to his fascist heritage, Amadeo’s proposal comprises of various corporatist traits too. This Hispanic bloc will strive towards “a fair distribution of wealth” for instance. And of course, it will grant citizen rights—“Hispanic rights” to be sure—that nobody would ever be “juridically a stranger in his neighboring countries.” That his speech advocates the “use of force as a political factor” is noteworthy, but even more so is the fact that Amadeo determines that the Hispanic bloc would need to triumph over communism in the battlefield of spiritual elation. “Against this mysticism, one can only validly oppose with another higher mysticism” he notes, and concludes that “one can only be a conservative in a revolutionary style” [Amadeo, 1956 (a), p.  216]. As can readily be seen, nearly ten years after the fall of the Axis Powers this Nacionalista addressed his audience in a plain fascist jargon. The Hispanic Community of Nations he proposed was not merely a strategic alliance; it was a revolutionary third path towards a spiritually elating modernity.

The decline of the discourse of hispanidad and Franco’s dual citizenship campaign

  • 28 In the following years, Amadeo would shift his attention to diplomacy in the UN, as a part of Frond (...)
  • 29 “El nacionalismo correntino presente”, Azul y Blanco, May 5th, 1959, p.  4.

20By the end of the 1950’s the Francoist regime saw a dramatic restructuring. In February 1956, the tensions between the Falange and the Opus Dei, and the protests of the Falange Student Syndicate (SEU) in Madrid [Lizcano, 1981; Ruiz Cranicer, 1996], led to the demeaning sacking of Laín Entralgo, then the rector of Madrid University. Subsequently, in 1957 Franco reshuffled his cabinet appointing his infamous Opus Dei “technocrats” to lead Spain into an era of liberal economic reforms. Now, after ten years in office, Martín Artajo, too, was forced to retire, replaced by the legal expert Fernando María Castiella. At the same time, Argentina’s 1955 Liberating Revolution presented further hurdles for the Nacionalistas. As one of the key actors in the toppling of Perón, Amadeo was nominated Minister of Foreign Affairs in General Eduardo Lonardi’s government, only to be discharged a scarce three months later by right-liberal General Pedro Aramburu.28 In turn, during Arturo Frondizi’s years of “developmentism” the Hispanic discourse was once again relegated to extreme Nacionalista platforms such as magazine Azul y Blanco, which time and again voiced its commitment to the “integration with our Latin-American brothers” and to “repelling the imperialisms struggling world hegemony.”29 To put it briefly, in a matter of two years the Argentine-Spanish ideological crusade saw the removal of its chief spokesmen and apparent desertion.

  • 30 Spanish immigration to these countries was almost inexistent. If anything, the late 1950’s witnesse (...)
  • 31 “La nacionalidad hispánica”, op. cit., p. 9.
  • 32 “Doble nacionalidad o supranacionalidad”, Mundo hispánico, n° 141, Jan. 1960, p.  4.

21But even as the Opus Dei’s Catholic spiritualism was replacing the Hispanic sacred, Franco’s foreign policy did not, for once, forlorn the Hispanic rhetoric. A good example for this is Spain’s diplomacy of dual citizenship agreements—a new concrete approach that now set out to redefine the physical borders between Spain and the Americas. Previous accounts of these agreements have alleged that Franco aimed to assist Spanish immigrants in America [Enrich, 1989, p.  64]. A close examination of the ways these pacts were represented in public reveals, however, that the Spanish migrants’ working conditions were not the principal motive.30 Rather, this was foremost an avatar of the discourse of hispanidad—the first step towards instituting the “imminent hispanoamerican citizenship” in the continent.31 Or in the words of Colombian intellectual J. M. Yepes: “according to our interpretation of these treaties, their aim is to gradually establish the Hispanic supranationality, which, beyond any political affiliation, would be the strongest device to amalgamate twenty nations into one spiritual solidarity.”32

  • 33 “Doble nacionalidad”, op. cit., p.  3.
  • 34 “Los beneficios de la doble nacionalidad”, Mundo hispánico, n° 100, Jul. 1956, p.  9.

22Franco, in other words, did not forsake the mission to establish a supranational community. The 1959 Cuban revolution made the need for action even clearer in his eyes. And yet, the history of these agreements goes back to 1954, when Franco first announced the principal of dual citizenship with Latin America and the Philippines. Antonio Iturmendi Bañales, Spain’s Minister of Justice, was the main designers of this program. The Madrid daily ABC even quoted him stating that “the Hispanic, a solid and enduring bloc, will provide, in the hour uncertainty in which we live, a guarantee for more peace; this peace anxiously desired by so many.”33 Two years later the Chilean parliament approved a similar law. This somewhat dull mutual legislation prompted a jovial Mundo hispánico editorial to announce that the nations now “engage in a superior community, while keeping their own personality without the loss of choice and sovereignty.”34 That is to say, even before the advent of the Cuban “menace”, the Spanish-Chilean accord had already been presented as the realization of a long-awaited Hispanic fusion.

  • 35 ABC Madrid, May 21st, 1959, p.  35.

23Overall, between 1958 and 1963 Spain signed as much as seven of these treaties with the following Latin American countries: Chile, Peru, Paraguay, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Honduras and the Dominican Republic. As one may notice, Argentina is absent from this list, along with Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela and, of course, pro-Republican Mexico. In short, in the early 1960’s Franco’s Spain opened its borders, physically and symbolically, to the more feeble Latin American societies, with Chile being the one exception. Moreover, dual citizenship was never promoted as a principal that Latin American states should implement between themselves. What these treaties actually turned out to be was a propaganda campaign in which ultra-conservative figures—Manuel Prado, Luis Somoza, Alfredo Stroessner and Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes to name a few—expressed their bonds with Francoism. The Cuban revolution was, in this context, a priceless rhetorical tool. In 1959 it was Franco himself who reassured his Peruvian counterpart that “the double citizenship treaty, signed in this hour of crisis spurred by disintegrating forces, is an instrument of peace and fraternity that revives the spiritual connections that unite Peru and Spain.”35

  • 36 “Solemna conmemoración del Día de la Hispanidad en Santiago de Compostela”, ABC Madrid, October 13t (...)
  • 37 Ideario del Congreso de Institutos de Cultura Hispánica, celebrado en Bogotá en octubre de 1958, Bo (...)

24Following Spain’s political makeover, the Francoist discourse of hispanidad eventually did undergo modifications, however. To begin with, despite officially opposing Pan-Americanism, Spanish statesmen henceforward avoided criticizing the USA. In 1959, Castiella even thanked the “generosity of the north American people”, merely adding that the cooperation between the Hispanics and the USA would be perfect once the latter “presents Iberoamérica with a constant, careful and efficient attention respectful our spirituality and cultural profile.”36 Moreover, also the characterization of the global Hispanic mission changed by then. For instance, the ICH Bogotá Declaration of 1958 states that “the Hispanic community stays true to the Catholic principle that every man is called to salvation”, and emphasizes that the Hispanic community depends on “improvements in the political realm, and social, technical and economic advancement.”37 In other words, Catholic salvation and an emphasis on “technical” development eventually replaced the fascist-like plea for spiritual fusion.

  • 38 Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, “Horizonte Español”, ABC Madrid, May 20th, 1965, p.  44-45.

25To make matters worse for the ICH, during the mid-1960’s Spain witnessed the appearance of a compelling new authoritarian language of development. Now, Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, Spain’s chief Opus Dei-affiliated “anti-ideological” intellectuals and Deputy Foreign Minister, was overtly condemning any revolutionary “utopisms,” promoting instead a modernization based on a technique of “science and technology.”38 As a result, by the mid-1960’s the Hispanic Community of Nations gradually became an anachronistic trope and an unlikely subject matter for the opinion columns in the Spanish daily press. And despite the ongoing prestige of ICH, by this time one could clearly notice a de-politization of its journals, followed by the gradual disappearance of its pompous Latin American conventions. A decade of relentless intellectual efforts thus came to a somewhat anticlimactic conclusion.

Onganía’s Argentine Revolution and the return to a discourse of “the spiritual community”

  • 39 “Información”, October 21st, 1966, Presidencia de la Nación, Secretaría de Prensa y Difusión, Parte (...)

26On October 21st 1966, General Juan Carlos Onganía, shortly after overthrowing elected president Arturo Illia and becoming Argentina’s de facto president, sent a letter to Franco, in which he stressed that “the Argentine Revolution had outlined in its founding documents the singular value it attributes to the spiritual community with Spain.” Onganía, who had paid a visit to Franco a year earlier, also expressed Argentina’s intention to pursue a “concrete foreign policy characterized by its growing integration with the states constituting the Hispano-American community, and with Spain, the key to this community.”39 As can readily be seen, concluding this article is Argentina’s brief return to a diplomatic rhetoric of primordial Hispanic essence. Strikingly, while Franco’s technocrats were neglecting the plan for Hispanic unification a new brand of Argentine authoritarianism made, perhaps for the last time during the Cold War, this foregoing vision its main priority.

27Fairly little has been written on the role of the Argentine Revolution (1966-1973) in Latin American politics. To a large extent, the deeds of this military regime have been dwarfed either by the Peronist authoritarianism that preceded it or by the dreadfulness of Argentina’s following military dictatorship (1976-1983). The years of Onganía’s rule (1966-1970) had been Argentina’s first “bureaucratic-authoritarian” phase [O’Donnell, 1988]; a state ideology that combined neoliberal economic policies with a peculiar patriarchal nationalist-Catholic discourse. Hispanic integration was, evidently, an inseparable element of the regime’s sense of self-empowerment, and hence defined its foreign policy.

28Predictably, Onganía retrieved several Nacionalistas to positions of power, albeit never too close to key executive positions. Mario Amadeo now returned to the public sphere as Argentina’s ambassador in Brazil. A more important figure in Onganía’s regime was secretary of government and public intellectual Dr. Mario Díaz Colodrero. As Paul Lewis has pointed out, this man was both a “product of the Instituto de Cultura Hispánica in Madrid” and a member of Opus Dei [Dolkart and McGee Deutsch, 1993, p.  163]. In his writings, an uncommon combination of Hispanic idealism and a technocratic inclination to “supersede politics” is revealed [Díaz Colodrero, 1968, p. 11]. Last, there was Nicanor Costa Méndez, Onganía’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, who merged hispanidad into Argentina’s diplomatic agenda at will.

  • 40 ABC Sevilla, July 11th, 1965, p.  39.
  • 41 ABC Madrid, September 2nd, 1965, p.  29.

29But these figures were simply overshadowed by Onganía’s own obsession with Hispanic spirituality. A year before his coup d’État, in his abovementioned visit to Madrid he already declared, to the Spanish newspapers’ unconcealed delight, that “an authentic Argentineness is inconceivable without Spain’s essence.” Then, in an almost sycophantic manner he confessed that his “entire spiritual formation is fundamentally Spanish” and that he would rather think of himself as having “Basque blood running through the veins” rather than Italian blood.40 On a practical level, two months later Onganía exclaimed that, given the Cuban threat, the Argentine, Spanish and Brazilian armies must form a pact to defend “the unity that exists between the spirits of their people.”41 Obviously, presenting himself as the avant-garde of the Hispanic cause was one of Onganía’s more noticeable rhetorical devices early on.

  • 42 “Discurso pronunciado por el Secretario de Estado de Gobierno, Dr. Mario F. Díaz Colodrero, en el r (...)
  • 43 ABC Sevilla, October 8th, 1967, p.  67.
  • 44 See for instance, ABC Madrid, July 17th, 1966, p.  73.

30The first years of the Argentine Revolution witnessed its leaders’ efforts to redefine their country’s spiritual role in Latin American, what Mario Díaz Colodrero labeled “Argentina’s continental mission.”42 Nicanor Costa Méndez led this endeavor, stressing time and again that the Hispanic nations, due to the “conditions of their nature,” have a “transcendental role to fulfil in the international system.” Not only should their “shared perception” be the key for their union, he argued; their “spiritual amalgamation” will undoubtedly lead them towards the “supreme objectives of humanity.”43 Costa Méndez interweaved these formulations with fervent attacks on Castro’s Cuba, in the years to follow.44

31Franco did not stay untouched by the gestures of his Argentine equivalents. Early in 1967 Spain honored Onganía and his Foreign Minister with the Spanish Navy Medals of Honor, an occasion that stimulated an emotional Onganía to utter the following words:

  • 45 “Palabras del Presidente de la Nación, Juan Carlos Onganía, al recibir la medalla de oro de la mari (...)

You all know by now how great my love for Spain is, and how this love molds the sentiment of the Argentine people. Iberia, a magnificent melting pot of races, upon fertilizing the arrogant American continent, has inherited us with its glory, the spiritual temple of its greatness. […] You are all familiar with the mutual intentions of our nations: identifying ourselves again with the spiritual mission and progress in order to put Hispanoamerica in a privileged position, within the conjunction of nations that history has presented us.45

32Clearly, on a rhetorical level not only was Onganía a “pater Nacionalista” [Matilde Ollier, 2005, p.  47]; he was also one of the most zealous hispanista Argentina has ever known.

  • 46 “Palabras de aliento de Onganía a la reunión de cancilleres de la OEA”, ABC Madrid, February 17th, (...)
  • 47 “Discurso pronunciado por el Señor presidente de la Nación teniente general Juan Carlos Onganía en (...)

33No sooner had Onganía instituted his regime than he began presenting his ideology before his fellow Latin American statesmen. Speaking in various Latin American forums he now demanded “new juridical bases” for the Latin American cooperation.46 Then, while dining with Bolivian dictator Alfredo Ovando Candía, Onganía called for political unity reiterating that “Spain’s colonial enterprise, the highest spiritual heritage, along with the cervantine language, constitutes the base of fraternity between the continent’s nations. […] This solidarity today is now being translated into a politics of integration.”47 And yet, it is not clear whether Onganía ever illustrated an actual Cold War bloc as Amadeo had done a decade before. He and his ministers moved from emphasizing military alliances to underscoring the need for a coordinated diplomatic action within the Hispanic world. Beyond his relationship with Franco, Onganía’s main effort seems to have been directed at a political integration of a somewhat lesser scale—between Argentina and its neighboring countries in La Cuenca de la Plata, for instance.

34Furthermore, unlike Amadeo, Onganía treated the USA in a more ambivalent manner, preferring to attack British colonialism of the Falkland Islands rather than the USA’s economic hegemony. This oscillation can be seen clearly in the following quotation. Referring to the Cold War division Onganía ostensibly continues Amadeo’s ideology at start by stressing that:

New groups of minor states can be seen emerging around one or the other superpowers. These nations seem to want to amalgamate with the nearest one to them […] emulating them—as they are being told—and thus abandoning their own national character, the mere reason for their existence. This cannot be the future of our Latin American nations. A humanist tradition, an ecumenical religion and a spirit open for all cultural patterns, separates us always from isolation.

  • 48 “Discurso del presidente de la Nación Argentina al declarar inaugurada la tercera conferencia inter (...)

35However, immediately thereafter, he declares that “luckily, Latin America is supported by saxonian America in a pledge to establish a world of elementary norms of coexistence for a great society.”48 Ergo, Onganía saw the USA as an ally of the Hispanic world, and reassured his audience that Latin America will never abandon its unique path due to its spiritual essence.

  • 49 La Vanguardia, April 13th, 1969, p.  5.
  • 50 ABC Madrid, April 15th, 1969, p.  3.

36Ultimately, Onganía’s one conspicuous deed in the direction of a Hispanic unification was a somewhat predictable dual citizenship treaty with Spain. Thus an apt conclusion for this article should be Costa Méndez’s 1969 visit to Madrid and the signing of this overdue Spanish-Argentine treaty. Only a month before the Córdoba uprising that signaled the end of Onganía’s patriarchal and technocratic experiment, Costa Méndez was now, to put it mildly, the most eloquent orator of the global Hispanic mission. “I hope we will outline the enterprises that the future of hispanidad demands from Argentina and Spain” he announced upon arrival.49 “The Hispanic truth needs to be divulged by us” he declared upon meeting with Franco, and dining at the ICH.50 As the next year was to prove, the downfall of Onganía’s dictatorship signaled also the termination of this short-lived attempt to stimulate a transnational Hispanic union.

Conclusion

37The campaigns discussed in this article should rightly be regarded as failed ideological projects, as they did not achieve their declared goals. Hispanidad, this ethnic singularity which Roger Griffin identifies as fascism’s “palingenetic mythic core” [Griffin, 1991, p.  33], obviously could not compete with the ideological power balance of the Cold War era. Tellingly, the Hispanic Community of Nations stands out as one of the first, and last, efforts to unify Latin American right-wing authoritarianism on an international scale. Last, there is little doubt that the intellectuals presented here—prominent in their own eyes as they may have been—had, in reality, a questionable level of influence on real politics.

38Still, I argue that as far as Cold War intellectual history is concerned there is much to be learned from this case study. For one, the point not to be missed is that the Falange, Nacionalistas and their Latin American right-wing interlocutors came together on the basis of coherent ideological consensus. The radical conception of the enemy, the profound sense of crisis and the belief that modernity should be refurbished through a systematic nourishing of the spirit—all of these views were deeply indebted to European fascism. Their reiteration on platforms such as ICH meant their salient presence in the Latin American public sphere in the 1950’s and 1960’s. For another, the lessons of the collapse of Europe’s fascist experiment had been seemingly learned. Thus, the novelty of the Cold War Hispanic movement was its urgent call for a universalist opening. It pursued a new relationship between human beings that goes beyond local nationhood, but that also does not encapsulate humanity as a whole. Consequently, not only was the fascist chauvinism replaced by a language of decolonization but Latin American speakers could be found uttering clear neo-imperial slogans, according to which Latin American nations are intrinsically lacking and that their merger is a precondition for their spiritual and material well-being. These positions, I argue, were uncommon in 1930’s and 1940’s Latin America, and should be thus considered a Cold War novelty.

39Further research is clearly required if we are to fully understand the motivations behind Franco and Onganía’s choice to act in the name of the Hispanic cause. As the rise Opus Dei indicates, this ideological platform apparently was replaceable. In all probability, these leaders gained a fair amount of prestige among their own people for aligning with a global Hispanic movement, not to mention leading it. One might argue that the Hispanic Community of Nations did not materialized since it was never meant to be more than a rhetoric tool for dictators to subdue ideological differences within their respective regimes. Still, if we are to follow Michael Mann’s advice then we should “take Fascism seriously” [Mann, 2004, p.  2-3] and delve into the emotional energy behind the Hispanic bloc fantasy; we should grasp it as a symptom for a moral language that was commonsensical all over the Spanish speaking world and that served as a form of communication between right-wing movements and intellectuals. In extreme cases, assuming the Hispanic “spiritual mission” should even be considered, as the case of Onganía indicates, the raison d’être of Latin America’s right-wing dictatorships.

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Bibliographie

Amadeo Mario, Por una convivencia internacional: bases para una Comunidad Hispánica de Naciones, Madrid, Cultura Hispánica, 1956 (a).

Amadeo Mario, Ayer, hoy, mañana, Buenos Aires, Gure, 1956 (b).

Calvo Serer Rafael, España sin problema, Madrid, Rialp, 1949.

Cazorla Sánchez Antonio, Fear and Progress: Ordinary Lives in Franco’s Spain, 1939-1975, Chichester, UK, Malden, MA, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.

Díaz Colodrero Mario, Dos politicas, dos Argentinas, Buenos Aires, Secretaría de Estado de Gobierno, Direccíon General de Provincias, Departamento Difusión Provincial, 1968.

Enrich Sílvia, Historia diplomática entre España e Iberoamérica en el contexto de las relaciones internacionales, 1955-1985, Madrid, Cultura Hispánica, 1989.

Finchelstein Federico, The Ideological Origins of the Dirty War: Fascism, Populism, and Dictatorship in Twentieth Century Argentina, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014.

González de Oleaga Marisa, El doble juego de la hispanidad: España y la Argentina durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, Madrid, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, 2001.

Gracia García Jordi, La resistencia silenciosa: fascismo y cultura en España, Madrid, Anagrama, 2004.

Griffin Roger, The Nature of Fascism, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1991.

Harmer Tanya, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2011.

Iáñez Eduardo, No parar hasta conquistar. Propaganda y politica cultural falagista: el grupo de Escorial (1936-1986), Gijón, Trea, 2011.

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Rock David, Authoritarian Argentina: The Nationalist Movement, its History, and its Impact, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993.

Ruiz Carnicer Miguel Angel, El Sindicato Español Universitario (SEU), 1939-1965: la socialización política de la juventud universitaria en el franquismo, Madrid, Siglo xxi, 1996.

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Notes

1 Alberto Martín Artajo, one of the more reactionary figures in Franco’s regime said these words while celebrating the Franco-Perón treaty that saved Franco’s Spain from economic collapse [Martín Artajo, 1956, p.  25].

2 Or as Federico Finchelstein points out, this case goes to show that paradoxically fascism thrives much better under liberal democracies than under other authoritarian regimes [Finchelstein, 2014, p.  94].

3 The strategic pact with the United States in 1949, and acceptance to the UN in 1955 meant that Franco’s Spain had now for the first time a respectable actor [Preston, 1995, p.  116-20].

4 According to Javier Tusell from its very beginning: “Franco’s dictatorship can much better be described as military than as Falangist.” That might be the case, but the fact that the dictatorship was administrated by loyal albeit “domesticated” Falangists, such as José Luis Arrese and Raimundo Fernández Cuesta, indicates that the Falange was still the most powerful ideological group in 1950’s Spain [Tusell, 2007, p.  15].

5 A member of José Antonio Primo de Rivera’s original inner circle, Laín Entralgo aligns with Américo Castro’s notion of “historization” (casticismo historicista). However, he also maintains that historically contingent styles of living might change, and that novelty may be incorporated into the national habitus through voluntary act. Thus, eventually Laín Entralgo departs from Castro’s ecological deterministic hispanismo, and proclaims that the nation is an ongoing contingent living project that is subjected to, indeed, the liberty of man (Pedro Laín Entralgo, “Sobre el Ser de España”, Cuadernos hispanoamericanos, n° 15, 1950, p.   470-89).

6 For instance, Ernesto Giménez Caballero’s canonical El genio de España is completely absent of this term—then the intellectual property of Maeztu and the Accion española reaction.

7 Instituto de Cultura Hispánica, Servicios de Información Cultural, Madrid, March 15th, 1962, p.  1.

8 Sanchez Bella expressed his pride over the quantity of the ICH conventions, held in Bogotá, Quito, Madrid, Caracas and even Cuba (Alfredo Sánchez Bella, “Diez años de cultura hispánica”, Cuadernos hispanoamericanos, n° 83, 1956, p.  136).

9 Terms taken from his notorious speech at the Día de la Hispanidad in Zaragoza (1954) and Barcelona (1955) [Martín Artajo, 1956, p.  101-30]. The ICH publications also covered these narratives at length (see Miguel Zelayeta, “Hacia una comunidad iberoamericana de naciones”, Mundo hispánico, n° 70, 1954, p.  10-11).

10 More on the “prerogatives of the mother”; see for instance “Una familia de pueblos”, Mundo hispánico, n° 82, Jan. 1955, p.  9.

11 In this case, in Franco’s own speeches, see for instance “Discurso de Jefe del Estado en el Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas”, ABC Madrid, October 13th, 1953, p.  3.

12 What historian of fascism Robert Paxton refers to as “a sense of overwhelming crisis beyond the reach of any traditional solutions” [Paxton, 2004, p.  41].

13 Raimundo Fernández Cuesta, “Una política de autenticidad”, Mundo hispánico, n° 73, 1954, p.  9.

14 As the ICH’s 1958 Bogotá Declaration puts it. See Itinerarios de cultura hispánica: memoria del Segundo Congreso de Institutos de Cultura Hispánica, reunido en Bogotá del 6 al 11 de octubre de 1958, Bogotá, Ed. Ximénez de Quesada, 1958, p.  33.

15 Blanca de los Ríos, “Hispanidad”, ABC Sevilla, October 23rd, 1953.

16 Carlos Lacalle, “Diez años en la política de la hispanidad”, Mundo hispánico, n° 103, 1956, p.  3.

17 His insinuation was that this state of affairs was due to Spain’s loss of empire (see Pedro Laín Entralgo, “Lengua y Ser de la Hispanidad”, Cuadernos hispanoamericanos, n° 70, 1955, p.  14).

18 “Doble nacionalidad”, ABC Sevilla, September 24th, 1954. The speech had been referred to also in “La nacionalidad hispánica”, Mundo hispánico, n° 79, Oct. 1954.

19 For several examples, see Jesús Prados Arrete, “Proyecto de una unión iberoamericana de pagos”, Cuadernos hispanoamericanos, n° 68-69, 1955, p.  4; “Pax Hispánica”, Mundo hispánico, n° 58, Jan. 1953, p.  5.

20 To be sure, the friendship between Franco and Perón, which dated back to the 1946 Perón-Franco treaties, never truly broke. The Spanish regime was even cautious not to allow any overt critique of the Argentine leader in its public sphere [Rein, 1993].

21 In fact, in the first edition of Cuadernos hispanoamericanos the Spanish were keen to voice the ideology of Nacionalistas such as César Pico, who had already articulated hispanidad years before in Sol y Luna. See “Nuestro tiempo y la misión de las Españas”, Cuadernos hispanoamericanos, n°1, 1948, p. 39

22 Mario Amadeo, “Perspectivas de la conferencia de Bogotá”, Cuadernos hispanoamericanos, n° 2, 1948, p.  264.

23 Mario Amadeo, “Hispanoamerica 1950”, appendix: “¿Adónde va Hispanoamérica?”, Cuadernos hispanoamericanos, n° 21, 1951.

24 Mario Amadeo, “Bases para una politica Hispanoamericana”, appendix: “¿Adónde va Hispanoamérica?”, Cuadernos hispanoamericanos, n° 20, 1951.

25 Juan Carlos Goyeneche, “Hispanoamerica y la unidad de cultura”, appendix: “¿Adónde va Hispanoamérica?”, Cuadernos hispanoamericanos, n° 21, 1951.

26 Estrada even assesses that it is the time for America to set an example for Europe, with a “style more pertinent to the exigencies of modernity” (José María de Estrada, “Reflexiones sobre hispanismo y lo nacional”, appendix: “¿Adónde va Hispanoamérica?”, Cuadernos hispanoamericanos, n° 45, 1953).

27 According to Amadeo’s own account, the publication of his Zaragoza speech was prohibited in Argentina by Perón, and was followed by a Peronist “anti-Spanish campaign” [Amadeo, 1956 (a), p.  32].

28 In the following years, Amadeo would shift his attention to diplomacy in the UN, as a part of Frondizi’s staff. According to Zuleta’s now-classic account, “at this moment he was a peronist” [Zuleta Álvarez, 1975, p.  698].

29 “El nacionalismo correntino presente”, Azul y Blanco, May 5th, 1959, p.  4.

30 Spanish immigration to these countries was almost inexistent. If anything, the late 1950’s witnessed a flow of Spanish workers to the industrial heart of Europe, France and Germany in particular. For more histories of Spanish immigration trends in the 1950’s, see Cazorla Sánchez’s book [2010, p.  107-110].

31 “La nacionalidad hispánica”, op. cit., p. 9.

32 “Doble nacionalidad o supranacionalidad”, Mundo hispánico, n° 141, Jan. 1960, p.  4.

33 “Doble nacionalidad”, op. cit., p.  3.

34 “Los beneficios de la doble nacionalidad”, Mundo hispánico, n° 100, Jul. 1956, p.  9.

35 ABC Madrid, May 21st, 1959, p.  35.

36 “Solemna conmemoración del Día de la Hispanidad en Santiago de Compostela”, ABC Madrid, October 13th, 1959.

37 Ideario del Congreso de Institutos de Cultura Hispánica, celebrado en Bogotá en octubre de 1958, Bogotá, Ed. Ximenez de Quesada, 1958, p.  33-34.

38 Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, “Horizonte Español”, ABC Madrid, May 20th, 1965, p.  44-45.

39 “Información”, October 21st, 1966, Presidencia de la Nación, Secretaría de Prensa y Difusión, Partes de prensa, caja 15, AGN.

40 ABC Sevilla, July 11th, 1965, p.  39.

41 ABC Madrid, September 2nd, 1965, p.  29.

42 “Discurso pronunciado por el Secretario de Estado de Gobierno, Dr. Mario F. Díaz Colodrero, en el recinto de la camara de diputados de la Nación”, March 6th, 1967, Presidencia de la Nación, Secretaría de Prensa y Difusión, Partes de prensa 1966, caja 15, AGN.

43 ABC Sevilla, October 8th, 1967, p.  67.

44 See for instance, ABC Madrid, July 17th, 1966, p.  73.

45 “Palabras del Presidente de la Nación, Juan Carlos Onganía, al recibir la medalla de oro de la marina de España”, February 5th, 1967, Presidencia de la Nación, Secretaría de Prensa y Difusión, Partes de prensa 1966, caja 15, AGN.

46 “Palabras de aliento de Onganía a la reunión de cancilleres de la OEA”, ABC Madrid, February 17th, 1967, p.  39.

47 “Discurso pronunciado por el Señor presidente de la Nación teniente general Juan Carlos Onganía en la comida realizada en la residencia de Olivos”, December 15th, 1966, Presidencia de la Nación, Secretaría de Prensa y Difusión, Partes de prensa 1966, caja 15, AGN.

48 “Discurso del presidente de la Nación Argentina al declarar inaugurada la tercera conferencia interamericana extraordinaria de cancilleres”, February 15th, 1967, Presidencia de la Nación, Secretaría de Prensa y Difusión, Partes de prensa, caja 15, AGN.

49 La Vanguardia, April 13th, 1969, p.  5.

50 ABC Madrid, April 15th, 1969, p.  3.

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Daniel Gunnar Kressel, « The Hispanic Community of Nations: the Spanish-Argentine nexus and the imagining of a Hispanic Cold War bloc », Cahiers des Amériques latines, 79 | 2015, 115-133.

Référence électronique

Daniel Gunnar Kressel, « The Hispanic Community of Nations: the Spanish-Argentine nexus and the imagining of a Hispanic Cold War bloc », Cahiers des Amériques latines [En ligne], 79 | 2015, mis en ligne le 23 février 2016, consulté le 22 septembre 2017. URL : http://cal.revues.org/3669 ; DOI : 10.4000/cal.3669

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Auteur

Daniel Gunnar Kressel

Daniel Gunnar Kressel prépare une thèse en histoire latino-américaine au sein du département d’histoire de Columbia University. Ses recherches portent sur les relations entre l’Espagne franquiste et les régimes bureaucratico-autoritaires du Cône Sud, dans les années 1960 et au début des années 1970, à travers le rôle de l’Opus Dei dans la constitution des idéologies d’État élaborées par Juan Carlos Onganía et Augusto Pinochet. Daniel Gunnar Kressel est titulaire de masters en histoire (université de Tel Aviv) et en sociologie (New School for Social Research, New York). Il a dernièrement écrit sur la transition démocratique en Espagne dans les années 1970 et sur les transitions de la « troisième vague ».

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Les Cahiers des Amériques latines sont mis à disposition selon les termes de la licence Creative Commons Attribution – Pas d’utilisation commerciale – Pas de modification 4.0 International.

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